Does the No Alternatives Argument need

Gerrymandering to Be Significant? by Dawid, Richard
Does the No Alternatives Argument need




In a recent paper, Tushar Menon has argued that the no-
alternatives argument can only be significant if the priors for numbers
of alternatives are tuned in an implausible way (gerrymandered, as he
calls it). In this paper, I demonstrate that priors needed for making
a no-alternatives argument significant are in line with what can be
plausibly assumed in a successful research field.
1 Introduction
Meta-empirical theory confirmation is a strategy to assess the probability of
a theory’s viability based on assessing the spectrum of possible alternatives
to that theory (Dawid 2006, 2013). If one comes to the conclusion that
the number of possible theories is probably very small or even one, this
assessment generates a substantial amount of trust in the theory at hand.
In Dawid (2013), three arguments of meta-empirical confirmation have been
discussed.1 One of them, the no-alternatives argument (NAA), was formally
shown to amount to confirmation under very plausible conditions in (Dawid
et al. 2015). In a recent paper, Menon (2019) argues that the confirmation
provided by the NAA can only be significant if one assumes a set of priors for
the numbers of possible theories that is carefully tuned (gerrymandered, as
Menon calls it) to achieve that goal. Menon argues that the required priors
do not constitute natural choices, which renders the NAA largely ineffective
under typical scientific circumstances.
1In Dawid (2013), they are presented as examples of a wider group of arguments of
non-empirical theory assessment. The three arguments that are based on assessing the
spectrum of alternatives have been given the name ”meta-empirical confirmation” (MEC)
in Dawid (2020).
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The present article demonstrates that the priors required for making the
NAA significant can be extracted in an empirically successful research field
from a second argument of MEC, the meta inductive argument (MIA).
2 The No-Alternatives Argument and
Menon’s Criticism
The no-alternatives argument (NAA) aims to significantly increase trust in
the viability of a theory H that accounts for data E0 in contexts where core
predictions of H have not yet been empirically confirmed. The argument
is based on the observation FHNA that, despite considerable efforts, no al-
ternative theory to H that can account for E0 has been found. From this
observation, it is inferred that there probably are no or very few alternatives
to theory H. The assessment that the number of alternatives is probably
very small in turn leads to increased trust in the viability of H.2
Dawid et al. (2015) give a proof that NAA indeed provides confirmation
under plausible conditions. Let TH be the proposition that hypothesis H is
empirically viable within a certain empirical horizon3 and let Y Hi denote the
propositions that there are i scientific theories that can account for the data
E0 that is accounted for by theory H. If five mild and plausible conditions
are fulfilled, FHNA provides Bayesian confirmation of H:
P (TH |FHNA) > P (TH) (1)
Then five conditions are (for their full presentation and explanation see
Dawid et al. 2015, pp. 218-19):
A1. , A2. Conditions on the conditional independence of variables.
A3. The conditional probabilities
P (FHNA|YHi ) (2)
are non-increasing in i.4
2This brief characterization of NAA leaves out a number of subtleties that need to
be addressed in order to make the argument fully coherent and meaningful. The reader
interested in a full discussion is referred to Dawid (2013) and Dawid et al. (2015).
3I call a theory empirically viable within a given empirical horizon if it can account for
all empirical data that can be collected within that horizon (for example, up to a given
energy scale).
4For simplicity reasons, I omit the variable D that controls the complexity of the
problem in the full formulation of condition A3.. The formal specification of D will play
no role in the further analysis in this paper.
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A4. The conditional probabilities
P (T|YHi ) (3)
are non-increasing in i.
A5. There is at least one pair (i, j) with i < j for which
(i) P (YHi )P (Y
H
j ) > 0 ,
(ii) P (FHNA|YiH) > P (FHNA|YHj ) for some j ∈ N, and
(iii) P (T|Yi) > P (T|Yj).
The proof given by Dawid et al. (2015) shows that NAA provides confir-
mation but does not establish the significance of that confirmation. Confir-
mation could be marginal and therefore, though formally realized, unhelpful
for scientific theory assessment. This situation is in agreement with the claim
made in Dawid (2013) that modes of meta-empirical confirmation achieve
significance only in conjunction.
Menon now raises the question as to how natural and plausible significant
confirmation would be in the scenario Dawid et al. (2015) describe. He does
not apply a rigid threshold for the significance of confirmation but requires
that P (TH |FHNA) − P (TH) be a ”non-negligible number”. He reaches the
conclusion that significant confirmation in this sense can only be achieved by
NAA based on deliberately chosen sets of priors for three important kinds of
variables.
The required priors amount to a considerable sharpening of the conditions
A3-A5 spelled out above. Rather than the very soft A3-A5, significant
confirmation would require the following much stronger conditions:
SC3 P (FHNA|YHi ) must show a significant decrease in i for low i-s.
SC4 P (TH|YHi ) must show a significant decrease in i for low i-s.
SC5 P (Y Hi )-s must have high priors for very low i-s that quickly fall off for
higher i-s.
Menon argues that SC5, in particular, is problematic. It is not a generic
choice of priors but would amount to what he calls ”gerrymandering”: spe-
cific factually unsupported prior assumptions are made just in order to al-
low for significant confirmation based on NAA. Gerrymandering of this kind
would make NAA clearly question-begging. Moreover, Menon argues, even if
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there were good reasons for assuming high probabilities for low i-s as priors,
NAA would be in trouble. Given that high probabilities for low numbers
of alternatives are exactly what NAA is supposed to establish, if those high
probabilities can be established already before NAA gets started, NAA seems
superfluous.
3 The Meta-Inductive Argument
Menon’s formal analysis is fully accurate. The distribution of priors he singles
out is of the kind one indeed needs for significant NAA. What I will contest
in the following is his verdict that this choice of priors is gerrymandered in
scientific contexts where NAA is taken seriously by scientists.
The crux of the matter boils down to the fact that NAA requires support
from other forms of meta-empirical confirmation to get off the ground (Dawid
2013, Section 3.1.). In the absence of such support, NAA indeed faces the
problem Menon describes. Scientific reasoning in a mature scientific field,
however, is distinguished by the fact that NAA can be supported by another
MEC argument, the meta inductive argument (MIA). I will set out to show
that MIA in a predictively successful research field very plausibly generates
the distribution of probabilities that is demanded by Menon. These proba-
bilities, which constitute posteriors with regard to updating under MIA, then
can serve as priors in a NAA argument.
Let me briefly recapitulate the general structure of MIA. The argument
starts from the observation that theories that satisfy some set of conditions
K tend to be predictively successful once empirically tested. Based on that
observation, MIA suggests that a new theory that also satisfies K has a
significant chance of being predictively successful as well. Being an instan-
tiation of MEC, the inference can be framed in terms of an assessment of
the spectrum of possible (conceived and unconceived) alternative theories.
MIA on that understanding establishes that the number of possible theories
is probably very limited, maybe even limited to one single theory.
The role of conditions K is to specify a group of scientific theories that
have a clear tendency of predictive success. Obviously, the history of sci-
ence knows a vast number of scientific theories that lack predictive success.
Therefore, conditions K must go beyond the mere scientificality conditions
a theory needs to meet in order to count as an alternative theory in a MEC
analysis. K should for example include conditions that constrain the analysis
to a specific research field or subfield where predictive success seems conspic-
uous. Moreover, it seems helpful to admit only theories that were developed
after a certain point in time.
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These two types of conditions still won’t suffice for establishing a clear
tendency of predictive success in most cases, however: next to every re-
search field, past or present, generates many candidate theories that are not
much believed in and never find empirical support. In scientific contexts
where many scientific theories with a wide spectrum of mutually inconsis-
tent predictions can be developed, most of those theories fail. Therefore, it
is important to add to K a condition that selects only those theories to which
a NAA applies. This is in line with the mechanism of MIA because a NAA
itself indicates predictive success by establishing constraints on the spectrum
of possible alternatives. Considering only theories that had no known alter-
natives before being tested is a powerful tool for isolating a group of theories
with a high rate of predictive success. Further criteria could be added to K,
but we will assume only the three criteria introduced above.
The question we now want to address is the following. Does MIA pro-
vide the basis for assuming the set of probabilities Menon establishes as a
necessary precondition for having significant confirmation based on NAA?
4 Meeting the First Two Conditions
Let us first address the requirements SC3 and SC4. Condition SC4 re-
quires that P (TH|YHi ) must show a significant decrease in i for low i-s. This
condition is generally assumed to be met when representing MEC.
In models of MEC reasoning, theories are individuated based on their
distinct predictions within a given empirical horizon. Once all data that can
be collected within that empirical horizon is in, all but one of the theories that
can possibly be developed in agreement with E0 are ruled out. On this basis,
one assumes that developing a theory in accordance with the available data
E0 resembles making a random pick from those theories that are consistent
with E0. In other words, before collecting further data E, one has no reason
to assume that the theory that is predictively successful with respect to E is
easier or less easy to find than any other theory that is consistent with E0.
This assumption implies the following dependence of the chances of novel
confirmation on the number of possible alternatives:
P (TH |Y Hi ) = 1/i (4)
The calculations in this paper will be based on (4). But even if one
takes Equation (4) to be an idealization, a considerably weaker relation that
preserves the basic view on theory development reflected in Equation (4) -
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such as replacing 1/i by i−x with x smaller than one but significantly higher
than zero - would be sufficient for fulfilling condition SC4.
Condition SC3 requires that P (FHNA|YHi ) must show a significant decrease
in i for low i-s. This condition looks a priori plausible. In a context where
many alternative theories can be built, it seems plausible to expect that, if
one of those theories has been found, others can be found as well. If there
is just one possible theory, obviously no others can be found. And if the few
possible theories exist, the more plausible it seems that complications related
to the construction of all but one of them have prevented the construction
of any of the other theories so far.
Condition SC3 is further supported by any case of successful MIA rea-
soning that involves the lack of known alternatives to a given theory as an
element of conditions K. If a strong MIA cannot be established based on
all theories in a research field but can be established once the condition that
no alternatives are known is applied, this establishes, based on successful
MEC reasoning, that there is a significant correlation between the number
of theories that are discovered and the number of alternative theories that
exist. Without that correlation, it would not be explicable why requiring the
lack of discovered alternatives was helpful for generating a successful MIA.
This leaves condition SC5, which to justify is the main aim of this paper.
As pointed out above, we need to address two questions in that context: First,
does MIA generate a set of Yi-s of the kind Menon shows to be required for
having a significant NAA? Second, if it does, why do we need NAA at all
as an independent argument, rather than merely using the condition that a
theory has no known alternatives as one of the conditions K?
We will approach the answer step by step by first calculating a simplified
scenario and then backing up its results based on a more general probabilistic
analysis.
5 Updating on the Success of an Individual
Theory
Let us first look at one individual case of predictive success of a theory H1.
Consider a theory H1 that has been developed based on a data set E
0 and
successfully predicts data E. Let TH1 denote the empirical viability of H1
with respect to data E.5 Let Y H1i be the statement that H1 is one of i possible
theories that can formulated in agreement with data E0. The question we
5In other words, we assume conclusive confirmation of the theory H1 within the em-
pirical horizon that covers data E.
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want to ask is the following: if we start with a given set of priors P (Y H1i ),
what are the posteriors P (Y H1i |TH1)?
Let us now introduce the following choice of priors for Y H1i :
P (Y H1i ) = 1/(
N∑
j=1
j−1)i ∀ i ≤ N
P (Y H1i ) = 0 ∀ i > N. (5)
For this choice of priors, we have P (Y H1i )→ 0 for all i in the limitN →∞.
In this limit, the expectation value for the number of alternatives i goes to
infinity. Still, the priors favor individual small number for i over individual
large numbers. We will motivate this choice of priors in a wider context







(P (Y H1i )P (T
H1|Y H1i )) =
∞∑
i=1
i−1P (YH1i ) (6)
Equations (5), (6) and Bayes’ theorem then lead to
P (Y H1i |TH1) =
























where ζ is the Riemann ζ-function. For the lowest i-s, we get:
lim
N→∞
P (Y H11 |TH1) ∼= 0, 61
lim
N→∞
P (Y H12 |TH1) ∼= 0, 15
lim
N→∞
P (Y H13 |TH1) ∼= 0, 068 (9)
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which amounts to an even more pronounced preference of small i-s than
Menon demands. On this basis, we can see already that the sets of priors
demanded by Menon are not entirely unnatural. Rather, they resemble what
even a scientist who a priori expects a theory to have infinitely many alterna-
tives might plausibly assume for any empirically viable scientific theory that
was developed without guidance by the data that eventually confirmed it.
Note, however, that what is stated in Equations (9) are the posterior
probabilities for the Y H1i -s of an individual theory H1 once its empirical
viability has been established. What we are actually interested in are prior
probabilities for a theory that has not yet been empirically tested. In order
to get there, we need the meta-inductive step of MIA.
6 A Simplified Take on Meta-Inductive Rea-
soning
A simple approximate way of modeling meta-inductive inference relies on the
(false) assumption that each theory that satisfies K has the same number
of possible alternatives iK . We thus treat the predictive success or failure of
each new theory that satisfies K as one more data point for specifying the
universal characteristic number iK . The modeled process resembles picking
balls from one urn with throwing the ball back into the urn after each pick.6
Our posterior after the previous pick can serve right away as our prior for
the next pick. We can thus simply use the set of posteriors Y H1i that was
extracted after H1 had been empirically tested as our set of priors Y
H2
i for
the next theory H2 that also meets conditions K. We then update on the
predictive success or failure of H2 and so on in order to estimate the set of
priors P (Y Ki ) for all theories that fulfill conditions K.
Based on this simple model, it is possible to put the choice of priors
chosen in Equation (5) into a wider context. Let us assume a theory H0 that
satisfies conditions K and start this time with a fully generic distribution of
priors Y H0i that has no bias towards low i-s:
P (Y Ki ) = 1/N ∀ i ≤ N
P (Y Ki ) = 0 ∀ i > N. (10)
If we update under TH0 , Equations (10), (4), (6) (all written for H0), give
6We’d have one white ball in the urn, corresponding to a given theory’s predictive
success, while all other balls (if there are any) are black, corresponding to predictive
failure.
8
P (Y Ki |TH0) = 1/(
N∑
j=1
j−1)i ∀ i ≤ N
P (Y Ki |TH0) = 0 ∀ i > N. (11)
which are exactly the priors we assumed in Equation (5). In other words,
the probabilities in Equation (5) represent updating on one instance of pre-
dictive success from the generic priors of Equations (10). Based on Equations
(4) and (6), Equation (11) translates into the following probability of predic-
tive success:




that goes to zero in the N →∞ limit.
A second instance of predictive success would then lead to the set of
probabilities stated in Equation (8). The analysis suggests that, even with
a fully generic set of priors that does not favor individual low values of i at
all, two instances of predictive success lead to very substantial values for the
smallest i-s.
The analysis in this subsection was based on the simplified assumption
that all theories that satisfy K have the same number of possible alternatives.
The next question will be to what extent the results found in our simplified
model remain qualitatively correct in a more adequate model.
7 Updating Probabilities of Predictive Suc-
cess
Theories satisfying conditions K that address different scientific problems
must be expected to have different numbers of possible alternatives. In this
light, the probability structure needed for fully characterizing the mechanism
of MIA is fairly complex. For each known theory Hn that satisfies conditions
K, there is a true number in of possible alternatives. We don’t know the true
in-s. Therefore, we would need to introduce a set of priors P (Yin) for each of
the s known theories Hn, n = 1...s that satisfy conditions K. Specifying those
sets of priors would give a spectrum of sets of priors. Assuming once again
Equation (4), each such spectrum corresponds to a probability of predictive
success for a random pick from the theories Hn.
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Since the only observation-based number that enters MIA is the overall
rate of success of theories Hn, however, we have no observational basis for
specifying or updating all dimensions of the spectrum of sets of priors. In
order to characterize the situation in a way that can be fully related to
empirical data, we thus need to define new variables. One way of doing so
is to group the spectra of in in equivalence classes: We characterize each





I−1K denotes the chances of predictive success of a random-picked theory
that satisfies conditions K. The equivalence class IK denotes those spectra
of numbers of alternatives for theories the meet conditions K that imply
a probability I−1K of predictive success for a randomly picked theory that
satisfies conditions K. To simplify the calculation, we now take the limit
s→∞, which turns IK into a continuous function. We are now ready to
calculate the Bayesian updating of P (TH)),7 starting from the set of priors
that corresponds to Equation (10) in an IK-based formulation
8:
P (Y KI ) = 1/N ∀ I ≤ N + 1
P (Y KI ) = 0 ∀ I > N + 1. (14)
In analogy to Equation (4), we assume for any empirically viable but
unconfirmed individual theory H that P (THn)|IK) = 1/IK . This implies
based on the rule of total probability:
P (TH0) = (1/N)ln(N + 1) (15)
which goes to zero in the N →∞ limit. Now we carry out Bayesian
updating based on two successive instances of predictively successful theories
TH0 and TH1 . Taking TH0 into account gives:
7H denotes a new, so far untested theory whose chances of success we aim to assess,
while H0, H1, ...Hs denotes the series of theories that satisfy conditions K and have been
tested already.
8Note that this choice of generic priors is not entirely innocuous. For example, the
scenario discussed in Section 6 that enforced the same i for all theories that satisfy K is
a special case of the scenario discussed in Section 7 but is inconsistent with the set set of
priors we now specify.
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P (Y KI |TH0) = (ln((N + 1)IK))−1 (16)
P (TH)|TH0) = (ln(N + 1))−1 (17)
This is the continuous form of Equation (12). Like in the former case,
P (T ) approaches zero in the N →∞ limit. Updating under TH1 gives
P (IK |TH0 , TH1) = I−2K (18)
P (TH)|TH0 , TH1) = 1/2 + 1/(2(N + 1)) (19)
We therefore find that two consecutive success stories of scientific theories
in the N, s→∞ limit lead to a 50% probability of empirical success for the
next theory that satisfies conditions K. High values for low IK and therefore
high values for P (TH)) are reached quickly from generic priors.
If we carry out further testing of new theories that satisfy K, a theory’s
predictive success will shift probabilities further towards smaller IK-s, while
a theory’s predictive failure will shift probabilities towards higher IK-s. The
probability, extracted on that basis, for predictive success of the next theory
that satisfies K would converge to the success rate one finds among the
theories that satisfy K for high numbers of tested theories.
We now see that the first step of updating in the simplified analysis of
the previous subsection, that has led to Equation (11), does represent the
probabilistic features of the full model. This is not surprising, since, based
on the first step of updating, no specific values for i get significant values
at all, which means that the question whether any such values indicate the
location of the one true value iK or rather a spectrum of true values i for
different theories plays no role.
The second updating from Equation (11) to Equation (8) would give
an inadequate picture, however, if taken to characterize our credence about
the entire set of all theories that satisfy K. One can see this clearly if one
calculates the probability of predictive success that would correspond to using
the set of probabilities of Equation (8) as a set of priors for a new theory
H. Using once again Equation (4), one would get 0,73, as opposed to the
value of P (TH) = 0, 5 we extracted above. The step towards Equation (8)
therefore can only be understood as an updating of the probabilities for Y H1i -
s under the predictive success of H1 but must not be understood as updating
of probabilities for Y Hi -s of a new theory H that satisfies conditions K but
has not yet been empirically tested.
The failure of the simplified assumption of one iK for all theories in the
given context is to be expected since we are now dealing with results that
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attribute substantial probabilities to individual i-s. The question whether
our probability distribution represents estimates of one universal iK that
characterizes all theories satisfying K or not therefore becomes important.
The crucial role of that question is most obvious once one considers updating
on a theory’s predictive failure. If all theories satisfying K had the same
number iK of alternatives, one such failure would send P (Y1) to zero for all
theories that satisfy K, which is entirely implausible: the fact that one theory
that satisfies K does have alternatives does not rule out the possibility that
other theories that address different scientific problems have no alternatives.
Only the more complex analysis sketched in this section can account for this
fact.
The simplified assumption of one universal iK implies that the expected
chances of predictive success of theories that satisfy K cannot rise above
50% after one instance of predicitive failure. A research field with a success
rate of theories that satisfy K significantly above 50% thus could not be well
represented by a probability spectrum P (YiK ). Any success rate significantly
above 50% thus empirically establishes a multitude of i-s among the theories
considered.
Let us take stock of where we are at this point. We showed that a the-
ory’s predictive success has a very powerful effect on assessing the number of
alternatives to that theory: it can generate high probabilities for no or very
few alternatives even when starting with the expectation that the number of
alternatives is infinite. We then saw that a simplified model of updating in a
MIA framework (that is, of updating under the success of other theories that
satisfy conditions K) leads to a strong preference of small numbers of alter-
natives based on just two instances of predictive success even when starting
from priors that do not favor smaller or finite numbers of alternatives at all.
Finally, we analyzed a full account of the probabilistic structure of MIA type
updating. This did not allow for the extraction of a specific set of posteriors
for Yi-s. It demonstrated, however, that, while the the simplified calculation
of high values for small Yi-s for a new theory H had to differ significantly
from any probability spectrum that could be consistently extracted from a
full account of MIA updating, the general conclusion that high probabilities
for the lowest priors are reached after two instances of predictive success
remains intact.
All three levels of analysis consistently indicate that a pretty focussed
Menon-type distribution of Y Hi -s can be plausibly assumed in a successful
research field where several instances of predictive success are known and a
tendency of predictive success can be observed.
12
8 MIA and NAA
The results of the previous section bring us to the second question raised
by Menon’s analysis. If MIA is so successful on its own in generating high
probabilities of predictive success for upcoming as yet empirically untested
theories, why do we need NAA at all as an independent argument?
Up to this point, we have painted a fairly idealized picture of MIA. We
have assumed that conditions K provide the basis for unequivocally and
exhaustively identifying the theories that satisfy conditions K. While pre-
dictive failures may happen, theories that satisfy K would have a fairly high
predictive success rate. This high success rate would then directly inform
our credence in the success of the next, so far empirically untested theory
that satisfies conditions K.
The real world is more messy than that. In the real world, each individual
theory we are considering will raise issues as to whether or not it satisfies
conditions K. The number of theories that satisfy K in a fully convincing
way may in the end be fairly small in a given context and individual scientists’
assessments regarding the numbers of predictively successful and predictively
unsuccessful theories that satisfy K may well differ from each other.
Moreover, each step towards a new theory H that satsfies K raises the
question whether the new theory is indeed sufficiently similar in all relevant
respects to the previous ones to justify an inference from the the average Yi
spectrum we have inferred for theories that satisfy K to the Y Hi -s for the new
theory. Even if one comes to agree that the specified conditions K are met
by the given theory, one might suspect that the theory at hand is in relevant
respects very different from previous theories that satisfied K.
All these considerations will significantly decrease credences for low i-s for
the new empirically unconfirmed theory compared to the averaged spectrum
of Yi-probabilities for theories that satisfy K. The power of MIA, though
arguably quite substantial in successful research fields, therefore must remain
limited. It may provide a basis for a substantial preference of low values of
i. But, on its own, this preference would be too weak for generating a high
degree of trust in a new so far empirically untested theory H.
This is the reason why NAA is dependent on a convincing case of MIA but
nevertheless has a distinct and important role to play. NAA has the advan-
tage over MIA that it is based on looking at one individual theory rather than
a spectrum of fairly different theories for which a common denominator must
be found. Therefore, it is possible to put particular emphasis on the search
for alternatives and the conceptual understanding of the obstacles to such
alternatives specifically in cases where the given theory is clearly very differ-
ent from others satisfying K (Obviously, this characterization fully applies
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to the case of string theory). Future research may be expected to substan-
tially sharpen the understanding regarding NAA, while it would normally
not contribute to a further improvement of MIA. In this light, disregarding
the independent role of NAA would lead to an inadequate understanding of
the ongoing process of scientific theory assessment.
The following overall scenario emerges. MIA can support the significance
of NAA type reasoning in a research field by looking at comparable cases
where empirical viability could eventually be checked. However, the signifi-
cance of MIA is constrained by the fact that it is a generalization argument
that relies on a set of theories that, though in a relevant sense comparable
to the theory we want to confirm, differ from that theory in many other
respects. NAA can now step in and rely on investigating the strength of a
no alternatives verdict specifically in the given case, carefully searching for
alternatives, developing a better theoretical understanding of the obstacles
to such attempts, etc. This individual view on the specific context under
scrutiny can then, based on the set of priors extracted from MIA, lead to
further significant confirmation of the given theory.
To conclude, we find that the Yi distribution needed for a significant NAA
doesn’t have to be gerrymandered but can be naturally generated by MIA in
a predictively successful research field. But due to the limited effectiveness of
MIA, NAA is still necessary as an independent argument in order to generate
a high level of trust in a theory based on MEC.
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